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For over thirty years, an ambiguity lingered in American
death penalty jurisprudence. After the United States
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a Georgia statute
that authorized capital punishment for the crime of rape,
a remaining question loomed large. Was this 1977 deci-
sion, Coker v. Georgia,' limited to statutes that allowed
the penalty of death for all forms of rape, or did it pro-
hibit the penalty of death only for raping an adult, thus
allowing a state to authorize death for the crime of rape
of a child? This question was answered by the Court in
the 2007-2oo8 term in Kennedy v. Louisiana2 which
barred capital punishment for "one who raped but did
not kill a child, and who did not intend to assist another
in killing the child," finding such a punishment uncon-
stitutional under both the Eighth and the Fourteenth
Amendments. 3
An unstudied reading of Kennedy might suggest that it
is simply a clarification and continuation of Coker. How-
ever, a thorough review of Kennedy demonstrates not only
a much broader holding than was necessary but also a
subtle shift in emphasis by the Court with potentially sig-
nificant implications. These subtle changes can be
discerned in several aspects of the opinion. First, the
Court has added nuances to the original two-step test for
proportionality in capital punishment cases to move away
from an emphasis on the objective component of the
national consensus and toward an emphasis on the
Court's own subjective judgment. Additionally, the Court
relied on new categories of information for consideration
in its proportionality analysis. Finally, these subtle shifts
contributed to the breadth of the Court's holding. The
actual holding in Kennedy is significantly broader than was
necessary to resolve the issue presented, especially consid-
ering the Court's previous jurisprudence in Enmund v.
Florida,4 finding the death penalty unconstitutional in the
case of one who aids and abets a felon in the course of
which a murder occurs when the defendant did not
attempt, intend, or effectuate the killing or use of lethal
force; Atkins v. Virginia,5 finding that the Eighth Amend-
ment bars capital punishment for the mentally impaired;
and Roper v. Simmons,6 holding that capital punishment is
barred by the Eighth Amendment for a minor who is sev-
enteen years old at the time of the murder.
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This Article will examine the Kennedy case and hold-
ing, focusing on the above-mentioned nuances of the
opinion, and suggest that Kennedy subtly altered death
penalty jurisprudence, not only to favor the Court's sub-
jective judgment but also effectively to limit capital
punishment. While the stated desire to limit the death
penalty is not new, some of the methods suggested by the
Court are worthy of discussion and analysis. This Article
will examine some of those subtle changes and reflect on
what effect, if any, Kennedy will have on future death
penalty jurisprudence.
I. Summary of the Kennedy Case
At issue in Kennedy was the constitutionality of the
Louisiana statute that allowed the death penalty for aggra-
vated rape of a child under the age of twelve.7 The factual
background to the case is one so severe that the Court
stated near the very beginning of the opinion: "Petitioner's
crime was one that cannot be recounted in these pages in
a way sufficient to capture in full the hurt and horror
inflicted on his victim.
"8
In March 1998, petitioner Kennedy telephoned police
stating that his eight-year-old stepdaughter ("L.H.") had
been raped. He claimed neighborhood boys dragged her
from the garage, raped her on the side yard, and fled. He
further asserted that he witnessed one of the assailants
flee. L.H. had been severely injured in the rape. Police
found her at the scene bleeding profusely from the vagi-
nal area (after Kennedy had cleaned her, thereby
removing any biological evidence which may have
existed). One medical expert testified these injuries were
"the most severe he had seen."9 Although both Kennedy
and L.H. initially maintained that others raped L.H., evi-
dence quickly pointed to Kennedy. Such evidence
included Kennedy's phone calls prior to calling 91i to car-
pet cleaners and others about the removal of blood stains
from a carpet; blood located under the victirm's mattress
as opposed to the location outdoors where Kennedy
claimed the rape occurred (which was primarily undis-
turbed); inconsistent and incredible statements by
Kennedy about the crime and what he claimed to have
seen; and crime scene evidence.'" Eight days after the
crime, police arrested Kennedy for the rape of L.H.Y After
she was removed from her mother's custody and then
returned in June, L.H. disclosed that Kennedy had raped
her.2 The defendant was tried and convicted by a jury of
aggravated rape under S 14:42 of the Louisiana Statutes,
which allowed the prosecutor to pursue the death penalty
because L.H. was less than twelve years old at the time of
the crime. 3
The jury heard additional evidence during the penalty
phase of the trial, including testimony from the goddaugh-
ter of Kennedy's former wife, who reported being
molested and raped by Kennedy when she was eight years
old.'4 The jury unanimously sentenced Kennedy to death,
and that sentence was affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme
Court.5 Kennedy then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which described the question presented
as "whether the Constitution bars respondent from impos-
ing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the
crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in
death of the victim."' 6
The Supreme Court held, in an opinion authored by
Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer, "based both on consensus and our
own independent judgment .... a death sentence for one
who raped but did not kill a child, and who did not intend
to assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 7 More
specifically, the majority concluded that there was a
national consensus that the death penalty is never accept-
able for the rape of a child and that, in its own judgment,
this penalty is inconsistent with evolving standards of
decency.' 8
As will be discussed below, the Court appeared to
employ the accepted two-part proportionality test it had
articulated in Coker, and substantially continued to employ
in Enmund, Atkins, and Roper.'9 As an overview, this test is
comprised of a two-pronged analysis. First, the Court
engages in an objective analysis of society's standards to
determine if a national consensus exists either in support
of or against the death penalty under the circumstances at
issue in the given case. Second, the Court looks to its own
subjective judgment on the propriety of the death penalty.20
However, in applying this test in Kennedy, the Court shifted
it ever so slightly to emphasize, among other aspects, its
own subjective judgment and new sources of information.
Writing in dissent, Justice Alito challenged what he
saw as the unsound, dually erroneous analysis of the
majority, with respect to both national consensus and the
Court's own judgment." As to the national consensus, the
majority and the dissent challenged each other's statistics
regarding which states authorize the death penalty for
child rape and which states tried to but were prevented
from doing so. The dissent rejected the assertion that this
case should be compared to the national trends of Atkins
and Roper, in which the number of jurisdictions allowing
the death penalty for the mentally impaired or juveniles,
respectively, was decreasing. More fundamentally, Justice
Alito agreed with the state of Louisiana in noting that
some jurisdictions understood Coker's rejection of the
death penalty to apply to all rapes and, therefore, were
reluctant to enact legislation authorizing such a penalty
for the rape of a child. "[D]icta in this Courts decision in
Coker v. Georgia has stunted legislative consideration of the
question whether the death penalty for the targeted
offense of raping a young child is consistent with prevail-
ing standards of decency." 22 While Justice Alito allowed for
the possibility that states such as Louisiana that author-
ized the death penalty for rape of a child were at the
forefront of a trend23 the majority did not. The dissent fur-
ther challenged the majority's comparison of the forty-four
states without the death penalty for child rape to the thirty
without the death penalty in Atkins and Roper.24
I do not suggest that six new state laws necessarily estab-
lish a "national consensus" or even that they are sure
evidence ofan ineluctable trend. In terms of the Courts
metaphor of moral evolution, these enactments might
have turned out to be an evolutionary dead end. But they
might also have been the beginning of a strong new evo-
lutionary line. We will never know, because the Court
today snuffs out the line in its incipient stage.25
Justice Alito argued that to the majority "what matters
is the Courts 'own judgment. ' 26 He then asserted that the
grounds on which the majority rested its judgment were
possibly compelling policy statements, but were not perti-
nent to the constitutional question of whether the Eighth
Amendment bars such a punishment.27
If. The Majority Opinion Varied the CokerTest in Some
Subtle but Important Ways
A. The Court Explicitly Moved the Test from Two
Equal Component Parts to One in Which the
Court's Own Subjective Judgment Is Paramount
In Kennedy, the Court did indeed continue to apply the
two-pronged test to assess the proportionality of capital
punishment within the Louisiana statute.28 However, in so
doing, there was a marked shift in emphasis from the
objective prong to the subjective prong of the Courts own
judgment.9 This is clear when one examines the test as
articulated in 1977 in Coker as compared to that articulated
in Kennedy.
Coker, decided just one year after Greggs reinstatement
of the death penalty, clearly notes (as does Kennedy) that,
as a threshold matter, the death penalty in and of itself is
not unconstitutional.30 Both acknowledge that the Eighth
Amendment bars not only barbaric punishment, but also
that which is excessive.3' Regarding the description of the
actual prongs, the Coker plurality stated:
[T]hese Eighth Amendment judgments should not
be, or appear to be merely subjective views by indi-
vidual Justices; judgment should be informed by
objective factors to the maximum possible extent. To this
end, attention must be given to the public attitudes
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concerning a particular sentence history and prece-
dent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries
reflected in their sentenceing [sic] decisions are to be
consulted.32
Contrast this with the most recent pronouncement of
the test. Rather than being focused on the objective factors
"to the maximum possible extent," the Court stated it
would be guided by
objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed
in legislative enactments and state practice with
respect to executions. The inquiry does not end there,
however. Consensus is not dispositive. Whether the death
penalty is disproportionate to the crime committed
depends as well upon the standards elaborated by
controlling precedents and by the Court's own under-
standing and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose.3
The Court went on to state that its ruling was "[b]ased both
on consensus and our own independent judgment."34
Although the Kennedy Court parroted the Coker lan-
guage regarding the objective criteria, it explicitly stated
that a national consensus, no matter how strong, is not dis-
positive. This is a far cry from the Coker language, which
stated quite the opposite: that objective factors should be
the basis of the analysis and only after they are considered
should the Court look to its own judgment. While Coker
made clear that the Court's own judgment should be con-
sidered ("for the Constitution contemplates that in the end
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question
of acceptability of the death penalty"), at best it placed the
Court's subjective judgment on par with the objective crite-
ria, or more likely, secondary to it.35 Indeed, the Court not
only warned against subjective judgment being the basis of
a decision, but against it even appearing to be the basis.3
6
This is also reflected in Atkins, which noted that the subjec-
tive prong's function was limited to the confirmation of a
national consensus. "Thus, in cases involving a consensus,
our own judgment is 'brought to bear,' by asking whether
there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by
the citizenry and its legislators."37
The preference for the subjective factors in Kennedy
was suggested by a somewhat conclusory declaration of a
national consensus. Rather than deferring to the objective
criteria, the Kennedy Court indicated it would be "guided"
by objective factors.38 It then found a national consensus
against capital punishment for the rape of a child,39
although six states had allowed the death penalty for that
crime within the previous fifteen years. The preference
for subjective factors was also apparent in the Court's dis-
cussion of whether a national trend was emerging, and,
more specifically, in its dismissal of the government's
argument that one reason so few states had adopted the
death penalty for rape of a child is the confusion sur-
rounding Coker.4O The government argued that, although
fewer than ten states had such a penalty, that was a signif-
icant number given the ambiguity of Coker.4' The Court
acknowledged that portions of Coker could be read to
apply to all forms of rape, but then disregarded that argu-
ment because of the other statements in the opinion, and
the repeated use of the phrases "adult female" and "adult
woman" in the opinion. 42 It characterized the question in
Coker as one regarding the rape of adult women. Yet, the
Coker plurality had stated "Coker was granted a writ of
certiorari, limited to a single daim, rejected by the Geor-
gia court, that the punishment of death for rape violates
the Eighth Amendment."43
The brevity of the analysis of objective factors is appar-
ent in Kennedy's dismissal of the effect of Coker on
legislators. Although the Court recognized that some
states had refrained from seriously considering legislation
authorizing the death penalty for the crime of rape of a
child because of the Coker ambiguity, it noted that "there is
no clear indication that state legislatures have misinter-
preted Coker to hold that the death penalty for child rape is
unconstitutional."44 As noted by Justice Alito, the labeling
of this view as a "misinterpretation" of Coker is interesting
given that it was the view of partially concurring Justice
Powell. In his partial concurrence and partial dissent in
Coker, Justice Powell stated his concern that the holding
was.clearly too broad in excluding the death penalty for all
forms of rape regardless of the circumstances.45 "Rather,
in an opinion that ranges well beyond what is necessary,
[the plurality] holds that capital punishment always
regardless of the circumstances is a disproportionate
penalty for the crime of rape."46
Having labeled the opinion of Justice Powell a "misin-
terpretation," and then disputing the number of states that
had adopted the death penalty for child rape, the Court
rejected the claim that this movement toward the death
penalty was indeed indicative of a movement across the
nation or, at a minimum, evidence against a national con-
sensus forbidding the death penalty. It rejected the notion
that pending legislation had relevance and finally stated
that the six jurisdictions that enacted the death penalty for
rape of a child in thirteen years cannot compare to Atkins,
in which eighteen states had forbidden the death penalty
for the mentally impaired in a period of fifteen years.47
Again, however, the Court ignored the climate of these
changes. In both Atkins and Roper, the avenue of change
was effectively open to legislatures to take without concern
that their actions would be unconstitutional. After Coker,
which was dear enough to an Associate Justice as well as
numerous state legislatures, the avenue was effectively
closed as a result of the perception that the death penalty
for rape of a child would violate Coker.
An unusual procedural event highlighted this prefer-
ence for the subjective view of the Court. In the original
opinion, the Court concluded that because only six states
had such legislation, and no one had been executed for
rape in over thirty years, "there is a national consensus
against capital punishment for the crime of child rape."4s
However, the Court, and apparently all parties and amici,
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ignored the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which
includes death as a penalty for rape of a child.49 When this
fact was brought to light after the issuance of the original
opinion, Louisiana sought a rehearing, arguing that this
significantly undercut the Court's conclusion that a
national consensus against the death penalty for rape of a
child existed. Louisiana found it particularly important
that this statute, as part the larger National Defense
Authorization Act, was enacted by Congress in 2oo6 and
implemented by an executive order in 2007.50
Not surprisingly, seven Justices of the Court voted not
to rehear the case. The majority Justices from the original
opinion joined Justice Kennedy's statement. The Court
noted that death for rape of a child has been the law in the
military since the nineteenth century, and yet the death
penalty has not been carried out in fifty years.5, The Court
acknowledged that Congress revised the military's sexual
assault statutes, but minimized the separation of the
crimes of rape and rape of a child.52 Congress approved an
interim maximum penalty of death, pending the final set-
ting of the maximum penalty by the President. President
Bush left the availability of the death penalty in place.53
The Court also noted that the death penalty was similarly
in effect for Coker. Just as then, this fact would not affect the
Courfs opinion here because the civilian and military jus-
tice systems are different regimes. Finally, the Court
concluded that the federal criminal law, which did not pro-
vide for imposition of the death penalty for child rape, was
more relevant.54 Although Justices Thomas and Alito dis-
sented, they wrote no statement. Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, took this opportunity to attack the
majority's emphasis on the subjective aspect of the test:
I am voting against the petition for rehearing because
the views of the American people on the death penalty
for child rape were, to tell the truth, irrelevant to the
majority's decision in this case. The majority opinion,
after an unpersuasive attempt to show that a consen-
sus against the penalty existed, in the end came down
to this: "[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the
end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under
the Eighth Amendment." Of course, the Constitu-
tion contemplates no such thing; the proposed Eighth
Amendment would have been laughed to scorn if it
had read "no criminal penalty shall be imposed which
the Supreme Court deems unacceptable."55
Although the Court applied the well-known two-
pronged test in both its original and modified opinions,
the Courfs actual application placed an emphasis on its
own subjective judgment.
B. The Court Emphasized the Goal of Decreasing
the Use of the Death Penalty Regardless of the
National Consensus
Throughout the opinion, the Court made several refer-
ences to narrowing the applicability of the death penalty.
Although the objective prong of the test was to consider
the question of national consensus, the Court minimized
this language and instead implied that the standard of
decency could only mean a contraction of the applicability
of the death penalty.56 In other words, no matter what the
consensus of the nation, the Court essentially believes that
decency can only be served by an anti-death penalty posi-
tion. The Supreme Court is essentially suggesting that,
regardless of the direction in which the states move, our
standards of decency by definition could not allow any
broadening of the death penalty. "It is an established prin-
ciple that decency, in its essence, presumes respect for the
individual and thus moderation or restraint in the applica-
tion of capital punishment.57
Although opposition to expanding the death penalty
was not entirely new for the Court,58 it had often been
stated in very different contexts. Indeed, in Atkins and
Roper, the Court noted it previously recognized that capital
punishment should be limited to the "most serious crimes
... whose extreme culpability makes them the most
deserving of execution."59 Both cases took that language
and applied it to classes of defendants who may indeed be
less culpable because of either their mental status or age.
Kennedy, however, expanded this language far beyond the
contexts present in Atkins and Roper.
Such a culpability issue was not present in Kennedy.
There can be no question as to the egregiousness of
Kennedy's crime, and his case has none of the class-of-
defendant implications of Atkins or Roper. Indeed, the
Court nearly opened its opinion by stating, "Petitioner's
crime was one that cannot be recounted in these pages in
a way sufficient to capture in full the hurt and horror
inflicted on his victim or to convey the revulsion [of] soci-
ety."6 o Although Kennedy was not representative of any
less-culpable group, the Court applied the language nar-
rowing the death penalty in such situations to him. The
Court took the "most serious crimes" language and nar-
rowed the definition. Unlike in Enmund, the "most
serious" crimes are not, apparently, defined by any of the
vast array of facts surrounding a case that courts tradition-
ally use to determine a crime's severity, such as the
presence of torture, extreme violence, or extreme vulnera-
bility of the victim. Rather narrowly, the "most serious" of
crimes can only be those that result in (or in the narrowest
of circumstances are intended to result in) a death, or
crimes against the state, or (rather inexplicably) crimes in
which the defendant was a drug kingpin.
The second manifestation of the Courts interpretation
of "evolving standards" as only against the death penalty
was in its characterization of such a penalty in this case.
The Court framed the act of applying the death penalty to
this crime as "expand[ing] the death penalty." 6' The state-
ment was clear that no matter the direction of a national
consensus, the "standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society counsel us to be most hesi-
tant before interpreting the Eighth Amendment to allow
the extension of the death penalty."
6 2
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Indeed, the Court explicitly stated, "Evolving standards
of decency are difficult to reconcile with a regime that
seeks to expand the death penalty to [rape of a child]." 63 By
implication, then, regardless of national consensus, it is a
principle of the Eighth Amendment to narrow the death
penalty. In making this argument, the Court referred to
Gregg and the recognized tension between general rules
and case-specific circumstances, which has produced
unsatisfying results. 64 "Our response to this case law,
which is still in search of a unifying principle, has been to
insist upon confining the instances in which capital pun-
ishment may be imposed."65
This backdrop is combined with the Supreme Court
stretching precedent further by taking the unrelated prin-
ciple of confining the death penalty to the most violent
and culpable offenders and applying it to egregious crimes
and culpable defendants, such as in Kennedy. The Court
then asserted that doing otherwise would expand the
death penalty.
The final point made by the Court was that the fre-
quency of child rape was so great that extending the death
penalty to such cases would increase the number of defen-
dants sentenced to death. This time, without precedent,
the Court stated that such an increase in numbers would
violate "the necessity to constrain the use of the death
penalty."66 Therefore, the Court has ruled out the death
penalty, no matter how severe the crime, if the crime
occurs frequently enough. Many jurisdictions enact severe
penalties to deter an explosion of certain types of crime.
The Court's concern that death may not be a valid penalty
for frequently committed crimes suggests that deterrence
is no longer an acceptable penological justification. 67
C. The Court Relied on Considerations in Its Own
Subjective Judgment Not Previously Considered
in Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis
It was not only the emphasis on the subjective test that
was a subtle shift from Coker, but also what the Court con-
sidered while engaging in the subjective and objective
analyses.68 These considerations include what the Court
regarded as the interests of the victim and possible proce-
dural concerns. Most striking is the Courf s somewhat
paternalistic assessment of the interests of the victim.
With regard to the victim, we continue to see a lack of real
understanding of the crime of rape and the victimization
of a minor. Although we do see a refreshing moderniza-
tion of the Court's understanding of rape since Coker, the
ultimate conclusion that rape is a less morally grave crime
than murder is unchanged. Initially, Kennedy explicitly rec-
ognized the shortcomings of the Coker plurality's
conceptualization of rape. 69 Thankfully absent from
Kennedy are statements such as those in Coker that the
rape victim was "unharmed," notwithstanding the fact
that she was forcefully raped in front of her bound hus-
band, had her life threatened, and was abducted.70 Indeed,
Coker was filled with misinformation about rape in gen-
eral, such as the claim that rape "normally involves force"
and "often physical injury."7' Finally, there was the oft-
quoted language reflecting the then-all-male Courts view
that "rape by definition does not include ... serious injury
to another person.... Life is over for the victim of the
murderer for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so
happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not
beyond repair."7 2 While Kennedy explicitly distanced itself
from this by stating, "We cannot dismiss the years of long
anguish that must be endured by the victim of child
rape,"73 the analysis did not fully come into a twenty-first
century understanding of the dynamics of the crime of
rape of a child.
Some of the views that underlie Coker's misapprehen-
sions about rape remain in Kennedy. First, the Court
embraced the conceptual conclusion of Coker
Consistent with evolving standards of decency and the
teachings of our precedents we conclude that, in deter-
mining whether the death penalty is excessive, there
is a distinction between intentional first-degree mur-
der on the one hand and non-homicide crimes against
individual persons, even including child rape, on the
other. The latter crimes may be devastating in their
harm, as here, but "in terms of moral depravity and
of the injury to the person and to the public," they can-
not be compared to murder in their "severity and
irrevocability."74
While the misinformation concerning rape of a child
may be present in Kennedy, some of the information relied
upon by the Court to reach this conclusion is novel to its
death penalty jurisprudence. First, within the Courts dis-
cussion of retributive theory as being an inadequate
justification for the death penalty in a rape case, the Court
stated that it "must include the question whether the
death penalty balances the wrong to the victim." 7 This
was markedly different than Enmund, which examined
deterrence and retribution as they related to the defendant,
not the victim.7 6 Furthermore, Enmund ultimately
embraced retribution, but determined this theory was not
served because the defendant class lacked culpability.
Atkins similarly discussed the effect of retribution only in
terms of how the severity of the punishment must depend
on the defendant's culpability.77
This focus on what was perceived by the Court as "best"
for the victim was a new consideration in the subjective
prong. To justify it, the Court referred to the fact that capital
cases require a long-term commitment by the victim and
that the victim will be put through this lengthy process in
his or her formative years.78 The Court questioned the valid-
ity of "[slociety's desire to inflict the death penalty for child
rape by enlisting the child victim to assist if and labeled
such action as "forc[ing] a moral choice on the child."79 One
curious aspect of this discussion is that each of these criti-
cisms is an accurate cost of any litigation involving child
victims. Yet, the jurisprudence has not proposed declining
to litigate such cases. The Court added another descriptive
reason for consideration of the victim in its analysis. First,
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the Court noted that most sexual victimizers of children are
related to their victims or are close to their victims' families,
and the availability of the death penalty will add to the recog-
nized underreporting of child sexual assault, which will, in
turn, decrease any deterrent effect of such a penalty8s These
reasons for opposing the death penalty in cases of child rape
are new considerations.
The Court also suggested some procedural policy argu-
ments. The Court declared, with little discussion, that
there was a "problem of unreliable, induced, and even
imagined child testimony."8' This last overly generalized
statement makes no distinction among the different types
of cases involving children, is a hotly contested claim that
is far from clear, and was stated by the Court with little
review. The authority for this assertion was the amicus
brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, as well as some of the articles cited therein. As a
general matter, however, the Court did not reference the
limits of those studies, nor did it mention other articles
and studies that qualified or challenged the claim.82 As a
matter specific to the case, Justice Alito noted there was lit-
tle issue of victim unreliability in Kennedy's prosecution.
Although it is true that eight-year-old L.H. initially cooper-
ated with the defendanfs story, she (as is often typical)
eventually disclosed that the defendant was her assailant
and had threatened her if she did not confirm his claims.8 3
Not only is it a questionable proposition that reliability is
an issue in every child rape case, but, as Justice Alito
noted, it was not at issue in this case, where the medical
evidence fully corroborated the victirrfs testimony. Yet, the
Court, without reflection, based some of its opinion on
such an over-generalization.
The Court made a second procedural argument. The
Court stated that because of the high number of child
rapes, the resulting increase in the number of executions
would be significant. In rejecting the possible solution of
utilizing more aggravating factors to limit any unneces-
sary increase in frequency of the death penalty, the Court
stated that such was not a sufficient option in child rape
cases. The reason offered by the Court was because such
crimes
in many cases will overwhelm a decent persoris judg-
ment, we have no confidence that the imposition of
the death penalty would not be so arbitrary as to be
"freakis[h]." We cannot sanction this result when the
harm to the victim, though grave, cannot be quanti-
fied in the same way as death of the victim. s4
However, this argument applies equally to homicide
cases. Indeed, no matter the charge, juries are often asked
to hear tragic, horrible facts. Even in murder cases with
egregious facts, we do not systematically question the abil-
ity of jurors to follow the trial courfs instructions and
decide cases and penalties based upon the evidence before
them and the law as given to them by the trial court.8 5 This
policy argument is remarkable because of the inconsistent
manner in which the Court has characterized rape of a
child. On the one hand, the Court stated that rape of a
child was not as morally depraved a crime as murder. On
the other, however, the Court also stated that the crime cat-
egorically was such that a decent person could be
overwhelmed by its egregiousness and be unable to sen-
tence the defendant in accordance with the law. This is
both internally inconsistent and, as compared to Coker,
novel.
Two aspects of these considerations of the Court are
notable. First, it is a dear expansion of the types of infor-
mation the Court has considered in exercising "its own
judgment." Indeed, this was a point not lost on Justice
Alito, who noted,
These policy arguments, whatever their merits, are
simply not pertinent to the question whether the
death penalty is "cruel and unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment protects the right of an
accused. It does not authorize this Court to strike
down federal or state criminal laws on the ground that
they are not in the best interests of crime victims or
the broader society. The Court's policy arguments
concern matters that legislators should-and pre-
sumably do-take into account in deciding whether
to enact a capital child-rape statute, but these argu-
ments are irrelevant to the question that is before us
in this case. Our cases have cautioned against using
"'the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause' to cut off the normal democratic processes,"
but the Court forgets that warning here.
8 6
Second, while some of these arguments are intriguing,
they are inaccurate, at worst, and not well developed, at
best. In any event, the Courts reliance on them marks a
change in both the type and quality of the considerations
on which it will rely.
Ill. The Court's Decision to Issue a Holding
Significantly Broader Than Necessary Indicates
That Kennedy Was Not Simply a Reassertion
of Coker
The official question presented on which the Court
granted certiorari was (i) Whether the Eighth Amend-
mentfs Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause permits a
state to punish the crime of rape of a child with the death
penalty, and (2) If so, whether Louisiana's capital rape
statute violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it fails to
genuinely narrow the dass of such offenders' eligibility for
the death penalty.8 7 The Court described the issue in the
opinion as "whether the Constitution bars respondent
from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child
where the crime did not result, and was not intended to
result, in death of the victim."
8 8
As discussed above, this description arose from a per-
ceived ambiguity in Coker as to whether its holding
applied to any rape, or whether it applied exclusively to
rapes of adult women. However, the Supreme Courfs
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holding far exceeded what was necessary to answer these
questions. The Court in no way limited its holding to rape
of children: "As it relates to crimes against individuals ....
the death penalty should not be expanded to instances
where the victims life was not taken."8 9
Kennedy held that the death penalty is inappropriate for
all crimes against the person that are not murder. In so
doing, however, the Court specifically excluded drug king-
pin activity from the list of personal crimes that are not
murder.90 Coker ignored the fact that people murder for
many reasons, some depraved and some not. Kennedy
expanded this ignorance with its inclusion of non-homici-
dal drug kingpins and others as more morally depraved
than one who rapes a child. The Court was silent as to why
drug kingpin activity is different from espionage or other
crimes. If the reason for the Court's judgment was the
broad effect drug trafficking has across our society (hence
its suggestion that this is akin to a crime against the state),
then one must ask about the effect of sexual assaults on
children in our society.9' The long-term effects of child rape
are indeed devastating and include, but are not limited to,
an increased risk of substance abuse, suicide, difficulty in
relationships, post-traumatic stress disorder, prostitution,
and sexual problems.92 Such effects involve not only the
victim, but her family and future family.
Why the Court expanded the ban on the death penalty
in this way is unclear. This is particularly perplexing when
the Court could have simply decided Kennedy by clarifying
that Coker meant what it said when it stated, "We have
concluded that a sentence of death is grossly dispropor-
tionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape
and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment."93
However, the Court chose a much more expansive hold-
ing, eliminating the death penalty as a punishment in any
personal crime other than murder. There is arguably some
room within the holding for imposing the death penalty for
the rape of a child in which the defendant intended to kill
or attempted to kill the victim. However, it is unlikely this
will be permitted, given the Courfs clear preference for an
evolving standard of decency that by definition narrows the
death penalty, its stated policy of never enlarging crimes to
which the death penalty can apply, and its willingness to
continue to decrease the number of such applicable crimes
by emphasizing the Courfs own judgment.
IV. Conclusion
Kennedy v. Louisiana is the latest chapter in the Supreme
Courtfs death penalty jurisprudence. The decision was not
necessarily surprising; however, it contains some sur-
prises in its analysis. In examining the types of
information on which the Court relied for its conclusion,
subtle shifts away from Coker are apparent. The discussion
of these shifts was not meant to suggest an impending
radical change in the Courfs view of the death penalty.94
Nor do they indicate a previously undetected radical
agenda of the Court. Rather, for the advocate, they repre-
sent views to be aware of as one attempts both to litigate
these issues and to process the current status of the death
penalty in the United States.
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